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DEPENDENCY BENEFITS UNDER THE
MASSACHUSETTS WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT
MARCEL S KISTIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The difficulty of anticipating future manifestations and complex-
ities of a problem is inherent in. the process of drafting effective
legislation. Framing the provisions for dependency benefits under the
Workmen's Compensation Act presented this difficulty in acute form.
The Massachusetts legislature was faced with the formidable task of
anticipating an infinite variety of marital, parental and familial rela-
tionships and applying to these relationships equitable dependency
benefit provisions. Omissions and inequities were practically inevitable
whether the legislature decided to meet the challenge in detail or to
formulate simple general principles. The legislature apparently chose
the latter course:
The Legislature may well have thought that it was not wise
to attempt at first to provide a specific rule for every possible
case, but simply to provide a few general rules easily under-
stood and easy of application and, as experience dictated from
time to time, to make changes.'
Probably close to ten per cent of all workmen's compensation
cases decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court have in-
volved questions of dependency. After fifty years of experience and
after many changes in the statute, dependency compensation remains
one of the most complex areas in the field of workmen's compensation;
there are still many omissions, inequities and unsolved problems. This
article attempts a clarification and a cHtical analysis of the law of .
dependency benefits.
II. GENERAL SUMMARY
The major provisions for dependency benefits under the Work-
men's Compensation Act are set forth in sections 1(3), 31, 32 and
35A of Chapter 152 of the Massachusetts General Laws. 2
* B.A., University of Wisconsin; LL.B., Harvard Law School; Member of the
Boston firm of Horovitz, Petkun, Rothschild, Locke & Kistin. The author gratefully
acknowledges the constructive criticisms and suggestions of his partners. The opinions
expressed here are, however, solely the responsibility of the author.
1 Murphy's Case, 218 Mass. 278, 281, 105 N.E. 635, 636 (1914).
2 See also Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 152, H 26A, 27, 33,.36A, 41-44, 48, 49, 50, 66,
67 (1957), as amended, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 152, H 33, 66 (Supp. 1963). See espe-
cially Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 152, * 1(4)(d) (1957), last paragraph: "employee"
means "dependents" when employee is dead
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Section 1(3) defines "Dependents," states the two general cate-
gories (next of kin and family membership) into either of which the
qualifying claimant must fall and provides that the claimant must be
dependent for support upon the employee's earnings.
Section 31 generally sets forth the amounts of total and partial
benefits payable to dependents of a deceased employee.
Section 32 designates certain persons conclusively presumed to
be total dependents of deceased employees and provides for partial
and total dependency in fact.
Section 35A provides for total dependency benefits to injured
employees, designates certain persons conclusively presumed to be
dependents and provides for dependency in fact.
To qualify for dependency' benefits a claimant must establish
by affirmative evidence either conclusive dependency or dependency
in fact. Conclusive dependents are always total dependents; depend-
ents in fact may be either partial or total dependents. The Act provides
for partial dependency only in the case of deceased employees. Injured
employees are entitled to dependency benefits only for those who are
totally dependent upon them for support either as conclusive depend-
ents or as dependents in fact.
Conclusively presumed dependents were provided for in order
to reduce litigation, Conclusive dependents include those persons
who are normally next of kin or members of the employee's family
and who are usually dependent for support upon the employee's
earnings in fact.
Those claimants who are not conclusive dependents must show
the general qualifications set forth in section 1(3), i.e., that they are
next of kin or members of the employee's family. In addition they
must show evidence of dependency in fact.
Dependency compensation is not vested. Upon the death of the
recipient, the benefits cease and do not pass to his estate or next
of kin.'
III NEXT OF KIN
A. Definition
"Next of Kin" means that ". . . the dependent should be in the
same degree of kinship as the statutory heir or heirs." "Next of kin"
is not ". . . the equivalent of dependent next of kindred which would
embrace all dependents without regard to the degree." It refers ". . . to
3 Report of the Commission on Compensation for Industrial Accidents (July 1,
1912).
4 Bartoni's Case, 225 Mass. 349, 353, 114 N.E. 663, 665 (1916); Murphy's Case,
224 Mass. 592, 594, 113 N.E. 283, 285 (1916).
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those who are nearest in degree by consanguinity."' A spouse does
not qualify as next of kin in Massachusetts"
B. Next of Kin Excludes Other Kindred
The next of kin take to the exclusion of those of a lower degree of
kinship.' There may be more than one next of kin if they are of the
same degree of kinship. In the case of deceased employees, the de-
pendents in fact of equal kinship share in the absolute sum as provided
for in the last paragraphs of sections 31 and 32. In the case of injured
employees, section 35A provides for weekly benefits to be paid for
each dependent in fact.
The rights of those claiming as next of kin were first discussed
in detail by the court in Kelley's Case,' in which a deceased employee,
a minor, was survived by a non-dependent father and by a partially
dependent older half-brother. The claimant half-brother could not
qualify as a dependent member of the employee's family because the
employee lived in the claimant's house and was in fact a member of
the claimant's family. The court held that, since the employee's father
was living, the half-brother was not next of kin and therefore could
not qualify as a dependent under the Act. That the claimant was not
a member of the employee's family was obvious, but, since this was
the first case under the statute in which the issue arose, the depriva-
tion of the dependent relative of benefits merely because a non-de-
pendent next of kin also survived called for some explication by the
court.
After defining "next of kin" and ruling that they exclude other
kindred, the court in Kelley's Case discussed with much insight the
hardship that could result in those cases where the claimant who is
truly dependent fails to qualify as next of kin. The court indicated
that an indigent, totally dependent mother who was not living with
her deceased son at the time of his death would not qualify for bene-
fits if the deceased employee left non-dependent children. The mother
would not be a member of the employee's family since she did not live
with him, and she would not qualify as next of kin because tne
employee's children, who were his next of kin, survived. The court
also pointed out prophetically that, under this rule, a dependent sister
5 Kelley's Case, 222 Mass. 538, 541, 111 N.E. 395, 396 (1916).
6 Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. Schwartz, 325 Mass. 443, 446, 91 N.E.2d 195, 197
(1950); Bailey v. Smith, 222 Mass. 600, 111 N.E. 684 (1916); Haraden v. Larrabee,
113 Mass. 430, 431 (1873). See Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 296, 303-04, 317 (1953). The
statement in Murphy's Case, supra note 4, at 595, 113 N.E. at 285, in a dictum, that the
minor children were next of kin "as well as the widow" is, no doubt, a loose formula-
tion and would not be authority for the proposition that a widow is next of kin.
7 Kelley's Case, supra note 5. Caliendo's Case, 219 Mass. 498, 107 N.E. 370 (1914)
is anomalous and is disposed of in Kelley's Case.
8 Supra note 5.
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may not be entitled to benefits where non-dependent parents are
alive. This hypothetical example materialized in Cowden's Case,'
decided within a short time after Kelley's Case.
In Cowden's Case the deceased employee lived in a boarding
house with his half-sister and was her sole support. The claimant
half-sister was precluded from dependency benefits because the em-
ployee's father (who was not dependent on the employee) survived
and was next of kin. The case is particularly striking because the
father, although legally next of kin, was not the employee's natural
father, but had adopted the employee after marrying his mother.
These old cases in which a non-dependent next of kin precludes
a deserving dependent kin of lower degree from receiving dependency
benefits are difficult to reconcile with the humanitarian purpose of
the Workmen's Compensation Act." It is doubtful whether these old
cases would be followed today.
In a closely analogous situation in Gillard's Case," decided some
seven years after Kelley's Case, the court found minor children to be
conclusive dependents despite the fact that their mother survived
but did not claim. The employee had died in 1918 when there were
no provisions for additional payments to a widow for minor children
and when, under the rule in McNicol's Case,' the widow would re-
ceive the entire death benefit. Here both the widow and children
claimed, but the widow withdrew her claim during the trial before
the board. The court stated:
It seems pretty clear that dependent minor children are
conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent upon the
father with whom they live in the absence of a claim by a
widow."
Since the widow survived, the children could not properly be
called conclusive dependents under a strict reading of section 32(c).
The mere fact that their mother was living would seem to preclude the
children under this section. The court, however, here carried the
rule, first suggested in Murphy's Case and later established in Bar-
toni's Case" a step further. Bartoni's rule, later enacted into law, was
that a minor child may succeed to the widow's benefits when she dies
while receiving compensation; Gillard's Case holds that children may
take even when the widow still lives, but does not press her claim.
9 225 Mass. 66, 113 N.E. 1036 (1916).
10 Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 349, 106 N.E. 1, 3 (1914); Gould's Case, 215
Mass. 480, 483, 102 N.E. 693, 694 (1913).
11 244 Mass. 47, 138 N.E. 384 (1923).
12 215 Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697 (1913).
13 Gillard's Case, supra note 11, at 56, 138 N.E.at 388.
14 Supra note 4.
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Gillard's Case probably indicated more pointedly than any other
Massachusetts case that the court would support the proposition that
potential claimants of higher priority who do not claim do not exclude
actual dependents of lower priority. This proposition should be equally
applicable to cases where next of kin do not claim. In such cases,
dependent kin of lower degree should in all justice, consistent with
the basic intent of the statute, be allowed the dependency benefits.
A situation similar to the one in Gillard's Case arose more re-
cently in Shaw's Case" in which the employee's mother claimed as a
partial dependent in fact and the surviving wife made no claim. The
insurer contended that the claimant mother should not receive
benefits because the wife, although she did not claim, was a conclusive
dependent thus precluding the dependent in fact mother. Generalizing
the point, the defense was that a higher priority potential claimant
automatically excludes an actual claimant of lower priority.. The board
disposed of the insurer's defense on the ground that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to support the contention that the wife was a conclusive
dependent. On appeal the court affirmed this finding and, therefore,
did not have to decide what effect a supported opposite finding would
have had on the mother's claim. But it is significant that the court
did not let it rest there. Referring to the unproved dependency status
of the wife, the court said, "The point, if material, was open."
(Emphasis supplied.) This means that, even if the insurer could prove
the wife's conclusive dependency status, there would still be a ques-
tion as to whether it would defeat the mother's claim since the wife
was not a claimant.
A careful analysis of the insurer's position in Shaw's Case demon-
strates the injustice of allowing such a strictly technical, dog-in-the-
manger type of defense, the only effect of which can be to defeat
the ultimate legislative objective of providing benefits to deserving
dependents.
The insurer's frank intent was to exclude the dependent mother
merely by interposing the theoretical possibility of a claim by the wife
as a conclusive dependent. The insurer, as revealed in the record, was
well aware of the fact that the wife had absolutely no intention of
filing a claim. In a hypothetical case, if a potential claim by the wife
were a serious possibility, a defense such as the one in Shaw's Case
would be too risky financially and would not be proffered. By such a
defense the insurer might well alert an unknowing potential claimant
to a valuable claim. As a practical matter the insurer would do better
with a partial than with a conclusive, total dependent. Although the
insurer could not produce sufficient evidence to prove the wife's con-
15 340 Mass. 717, 166 N.E.2d 718 (1960).
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elusive dependency in Shaw's Case, there was theoretically nothing to
prevent the wife from coming in later, assuming no problem of late
claim or prejudice to the insurer," proving just cause or desertion and
collecting dependency benefits back to the date of death. As of the
date of the wife's award, benefits to the mother would necessarily
end. The insurer would thus have made two inconsistent payments
up to the time of the board's award to the wife and, in addition, would
pay a higher rate to the wife thereafter. Furthermore, the insurer
would not be entitled to reimbursement by the mother. The mother
could protect the amount paid her by the insurer by securing a decree
in the superior court under sections 8 and 11, thus making her award
res judicata even after the award to the wife.
From the insurer's viewpoint, it may seem unfair to be exposed
to double payments until the time the higher priority dependent files
a claim. However, if such a claim is filed six months or more following
the employee's death, the insurer can defend against the claim under
sections 41 and 49. From the viewpoint of the lower priority claimant,
it is unfair permanently to deny him dependency benefits in this situa-
tion and thereby allow the insurer a windfall, especially when there
are at least two possible claimants and in view of the fact that the
danger to the insurer of double payments is limited to a period of
six months or less." Since workmen's compensation follows equity,"
it would seem fair to allow a lower priority claim when a potential
higher priority claimant does not file a claim. Under equity principles
more harm would be done to the lower priority claimant by allowing
the insurer's defense of a potential higher priority claimant than is
done the insurer by denying such a defense.
IV. MEMBERS OF THE EMPLOYEE'S FAMILY
A. Definition
"'Family' in its usual sense means 'the collective body of persons
who live in one house, and under one head or management.'"s "The
word 'family' has been frequently a subject for interpretation. While
in its ordinary and primary sense the term signifies persons living in
one house, still it is of ten used in common speech as including hus-
band and wife.' "In view of the purpose sought to be accomplished
by the workmen's compensation act, . . . the wife of an employee
10 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 152, §§ 41 and 49 (1957).
17 As, for example, by the widow's remarriage within the six month period.
18 Humphrey's Case, 226 Mass 143, 145, 115 N.E. 253, 254 (1917); Pigeon's Case,
216 Mass. 51, 54, 102 N.E. 932, 934 (1913); Gould's Case, supra note 10, at 483, 102
N.E. at 694.
18 Cowden's Case, supra note 9, at 67, 113 N.E. at 1037.
20 Newman's Case, 222 Mass. 563, 568, 111 N.E. 359, 362 (1916).
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may be found to be a member of his family even if not actually liv-
ing with him at the time of the injury.""
B. "Members of the Employee's Family" Liberally Interpreted
Dependents who claim as members of the employee's family are
accorded much more liberal treatment under the Act than those who
must compete as his next of kin. The reason, apparently, is that there
is much greater freedom of interpretation in the phrase "members of
the employee's family" than within the rigid bounds of the phrase
"next of kin."
A wife who is living apart from her husband and, therefore, not
conclusively presumed to be his dependent, may yet qualify as a
dependent member of his family and receive dependency benefits.'
It is also possible for a married daughter to qualify as her father's
partial dependent (both as his next of kin and as a member of his
family) even if she lives with her husband in her father's home."
Furthermore, a person may qualify as a dependent of a deceased
employee (as a member of his family) although there is neither mari-
tal nor blood relationship of any kind between them."
C. Illegitimate Children
It is clear that illegitimate children in Massachusetts do not
qualify as "children" under the conclusive presumption provisions of
sections 32 and 35A, nor 'do they qualify as next of kin. However,
they may qualify as members of the employee's family. 25 Since family
membership is the basis, it is equally clear that illegitimate children
who live apart from the employee cannot qualify as dependents."
Gritta's Case enunciates the humanitarian principle upon which
illegitimate children are endowed with dependency status:
Considerations of public policy which would prevent a wrong-
doer from participating in the benefits of the act ought not
to apply to innocent children born out of lawful matrimony;
they are not responsible for their existence or status, they
have committed no wrong, and they must be supported as
the death of the employee has taken from them the care and
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid. See also Gallagher's Case, 219 Mass. 140, 106 N.E. 558 (1914) ; Nelson's
Case, 217 Mass. 467, 105 N.E. 357 (1914). In all three of these cases, the husband and
wife were living apart and the court remanded for findings of dependency in fact.
23 Belanger's Case, 274 Mass. 371, 174 N.E. 497 (1931).
.24 Peterson's Case, 270 Mass. 309, 169 N.E. 779 (1930).
26 Gritta's Case, 236 Mass. 204, 127 N.E. 889 (1920); Horovitz, Workmen's Com-
pensation 300 (1944).
26 Olson's Case, 247 Mass. 570, 142 N.E. 808 (1924); Broadbent's Case, 240 Mass.
449, 134 N.E. 632 (1922).
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maintenance which they had previously received from him
as the head of the family?'
In Gritta's Case the mother of the illegitimate children had left a hus-
band in Italy who was in jail for life and she believed that her mar-
riage ceremony with the employee in this country was legal. Although
the mother was not a dependent because she was not the legal wife
of the employee (she was not next of kin and public policy precluded
her status as a member of the employee's family), their children were
in this case awarded dependency benefits as members of the em-
ployee's family.
Moore's Case' presents an interesting contrast to Gritta. In
Moore's Case, the employee lived and cohabited with a Mary Lacey
for about nine years. She was separated but not divorced from her
husband who appeared occasionally to visit his own daughter, Flora,
for whom he also contributed board money. During the time the em-
ployee lived and cohabited with Mrs Lacey, she had six illegitimate
children, the claimants in this case, fathered by him. But in this case
the principle of protecting innocent illegitimate children, as set forth
in Gritta's Case, was held not applicable, and the children were denied
dependency compensation.
Certainly from the viewpoint of the innocent illegitimate children,
it is difficult to distinguish Gritta's Case from Moore's Case. The court
points out that the employee in Moore's Case could not have been the
head of the family based on kinship or marriage. The same is true in
Gritta's Case. According to the court, there was a moral obligation
on the employee to support his illegitimate children in Gritta's Case;
the identical obligation can be said to exist in Moore's Case. The
employees in both cases clearly met their obligations to their illegiti-
mate children and supported them and made homes for them. Al-
though the evidence in Moore's Case shows that the employee turned
over "much the larger part of his earnings to Mrs. Lacey," that she
had no other income except the money she got for Flora's board from
her legal husband and that the employee behaved in other respects as
the father and family head, the court nevertheless found no evidence
that the employee managed the affairs of the household. Notably, the
question of who managed the household is not raised by the court in
Gritta's Case. The court then proceeded to the conclusion in Moore's
Case that on all the facts the status of the employee was no more
than that of a boarder whose very substantial contributions from his
earnings merely paid for his board and for his illicit relations with
Mrs. Lacey. The very same conclusion might have been reached by
27 Gritta's Case, supra note 25, at 207, 127 N.E. at 890.
28 294 Mass. 557, 3 N.E.2d 5 (1936).
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this reasoning in Gritta's Case. Finally the court invoked the doctrine
that neither spouse may testify as to non-access. Perhaps, this is
technically more difficult to overcome for the claimants in Moore's
Case.
The result in Moore's Case was that the innocent illegitimate
children either had to suffer deprivation because of the wrongdoing
of their parents, or apply for public charity, or the innocent and legal
husband had to be saddled with the responsibility of supporting six
children born to his wife by another man. The latter, in fact, was the
conclusion of the court:
And, whatever was the effect of the misconduct of Mrs. Lacey
on the duty of her husband to support her, for aught that
appears he was legally bound to support the claimants though
they were living apart from him. . . . He could not, as a mat-
ter of law, abandon his duty to support them?
The significant distinction between the two cases is that in Gritta's
Case the husband was in jail for life in Italy and the wife went through
a marriage ceremony in good faith with the employee; in Moore's
Case there was not a good faith marriage ceremony and the legal
husband was on the scene. For the young claimants in Moore's Case
this distinction does not explain away the humanitarian doctrine of
Gritta's Case.
It is to be hoped that Moore's Case would not be rigidly followed
today. The more recent trend is to recognize illegitimate children as
"children" for purposes of workmen's compensation (thus conclusive
dependents under the Massachusetts Act). 3° Where the courts have
not gone quite so far, it has at least been held that even where a
woman knows her cohabitation is illicit (as in Moore), the children
qualify as members of the employee's family."
D. A "Wife" Under an Invalid Marriage
Both Moore and Gritta are clear as to the status of the mother
of the illegitimate children. Public policy prevents a wrongdoer from
participating in the benefits of the Act and this includes the mother
in Gritta as well as in Moore. Neither is next of kin and neither can
be given the status of a family member under public policy.
Something should be said, however, on behalf of the mother in
Gritta's Case. She had gone through a marriage ceremony with the
29 Id. at 561, 3 N.E.2d at 7. It has been suggested that the husband in Gritta's
Case fared far better in jail in Italy than the husband in Moore's Case who suddenly
found himself the father of six more children by another man.
39 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 62.22 (1952).
81 Id. at § 62.23.
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employee in the good faith belief that it was legal. The "good faith"
element has been held a basis for allowing the "wife" dependency
benefits as a member of the employee's family."
E. The Family Abode
One of the problems that arose in both Cowden's Case" and
Peterson's Case" was whether a boarding house was a proper family
abode as a factor in determining whether the employee was head of
a family. By defining the family as ". . . the collective body of persons
who live in one house and under one head or management," the court,
in the context of Cowden's Case, seemed to reject the boarding house
as a suitable abode. In Peterson's Case, however, decided some four-
teen years later, the court reached back to a dictum in Nelson's Case,"
decided two years before Cowden, as support for the acceptance of the
boarding house as a family abode.
The dictum from Nelson's Case," relied upon in Peterson's Case,
concerned itself with a husband-wife relationship. There is obviously
a difference between husband and wife on the one hand (Nelson's
Case) and a brother-sister relationship (Cowden's Case) or non-
relatives (Peterson's Case) on the other hand. Clearly, wherever
husband and wife live, there is a family. Even so, the court in Peter-
son's Case, quoting from Nelson's Case, stated, " 'The matrimonial
abode may be a roof of their own, a hired tenement, a boarding house,
a rented room, or even a room in the house of a relative or friend,
however humble or temporary it may be.'"" On this basis the court
supported the finding of a family of non-relatives in a boarding house.
Thus, the dictum from Nelson's Case, combined with the hold-
ing in Peterson's Case, undoubtedly establish the acceptability of a
boarding house or some similar informal living arrangement as a
family abode and, at least implicitly, overrule whatever contrary in-
ference exists in Cowden's Case.
V. CONTRIBUTION, OBLIGATION, NEED AND EARNINGS—
PREREQUISITES FOR DEPENDENCY IN FACT
A. Generally
In all cases not covered by the provisions for conclusive de-
pendency, where the claimant must rely upon proof that he is a
32 Ibid. See also Van Bibber's Case, 343 Mass. 443, 179 N.E.2d 253 (1962); Crad-
dock's Case, 310 Mass. 116, 37 N.E.2d 508 (1941); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 207, 6 (1932),
a statutory good faith provision.
33 225 Mass. 66, 113 N.E. 1036 (1916).
84 Supra note 24.
36 Supra note 22, at 469, 105 N.E. at 358.
36 Ibid.
37 Peterson's Case, supra note 24, at 312, 169 N.E. at 780.
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dependent in fact, either as a next of kin or a member of the em-
ployee's family, generally it must also be shown that contributions
were made by the employee to the dependent, that there was an obli-
gation (either moral or legal) by the employee to support, that there
was need for support by the dependent and that the source of the
dependent's support was the employee's earnings as distinguished
from other sources of income.
B. Contributions by the Employee; Generally, Dependent in Fact
Must Have Received Support Prior to Injury
In cases of dependency in fact, the court generally requires evi-
dence that the claimant actually received support prior to the injury."
"A simple expression of purpose to contribute to support, unac-
companied by any actual contribution after reasonable opportunity,
would not constitute dependency!" 8°
In DiClavio's Case" there was no conclusive dependency, and
since there was no finding that the wife received any support from
the employee, there was no dependency in fact. In Gorski's Case'
the employee left his home in Poland and came to Massachusetts
seven months before he died in an industrial accident. He had started
working about one or two months before his death, but sent no money
out of his earnings to his wife. He had previously sent to his wife
some money he had obtained from his son. The employee owned a
home in Poland where his wife was living and where she was operating
his farm with the assistance of a hired man. Although there was also
evidence that he intended to have his wife join him later, the court
found no dependency in fact.
The contribution requirement is liberally applied on appropriate
facts, however, and the court found in McMahon's Case" that even
a minimal payment of $27 out of the employee's total annual in-
come of $818 was sufficient to meet the requirement of past support.
Dependency status may even be awarded when there is no contribu-
tion out of current earnings. In Freeman's Case" the minor employee
died before his first pay day on a new job, but had declared his in-
tention to send to his mother money from his earnings, and it was,
indeed, his filial duty to do so. The court upheld a finding of partial
dependency and an award of compensation to the mother. The de-
ceased employee had made previous contributions to his mother from
38 Freeman's Case, 233 Mass. 287, 123 N.E. 845 (1919).
89 Id. at 290, 123 N.E. at 846.
40 293 Mass. 259, 199 N.E. 732 (1936).
41 227 Mass. 456, 116 N.E. 811 (1917),
42 229 Mass. 48, 118 N.E. 189 (1918).
43 Supra note 38.
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earlier jobs in the year preceding death. In Hassan's Case" the em-
ployee attempted to send $500 to his wife and children in Syria dur-
ing the year prior to his death. Because of the state of international
affairs, transmission of the money was impossible. The court allowed
the finding of partial dependency in fact to stand, but denied re-
covery because there was in fact no contribution.
A strict requirement of actual contribution may work undue
hardship. One who is clearly a dependent, but has not received sup-
port, for one good reason or another, in the year prior to death, as in
Hassan's Case, may be in at least as deserving a position and be at
least as much dependent as one who has received a minimal contribu-
tion. It seems perfectly reasonable to interpret the statutory words
"who were dependent" as including, in appropriate cases, those who
have not, as well as those who have, received contributions. It is
notable, in this connection, that under the provisions of conclusive
dependency a wife who has not received any support for extended
periods of time from the husband who deserted her or whom she left
for justifiable cause would, nevertheless, qualify for dependency bene-
fits. At least, in such cases the legislature recognized, in theory, a
dependency status without any actual support contributions. In cases
of dependency in fact, contributions by the employee are, along with
other evidence, indicia of dependency, but they should not be con-
sidered absolute prerequisites.°
C. Employee Must Be Under Moral or Legal Obligation to Support
Claimant
Where there is no conclusively presumed dependency, it must
appear that the employee is under a moral or legal obligation to
support the claimant. In Cowden's Case," in addition to the fact that
she was not next of kin and was living with her half-brother in a
boarding house, the half-sister did not qualify as his dependent be-
cause the court found no obligation by the half-brother to support
her. Furthermore, the claimant was supported by the half-brother
for only three months, while her father, who maintained a suitable
home, had repeatedly asked her to come to live with him and, as a
father, had both a legal and a moral obligation to support her.
In Peterson's Case," the dependent was not related to the em-
ployee by either blood or marriage. The dependent and her husband
had taken over the care and upbringing of the employee when he was
44 240 Mass. 355, 134 N.E. 260 (1922).
46 For further discussion of the nature of contributions in computing dependency
benefits, see Part VIII, D, 2, infra.
96 Supra note 33.
47 270 Mass. 309, 169 N.E. 779 (1930).
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twelve years old although his natural mother was still alive; in fact,
she survived him. After the dependent's husband died and she had lost
all her property, the employee, now about eighteen or nineteen, went
to work and undertook to support and provide a home for the depend-
ent. The employee's moral obligation to support in this case was so
compelling that his status as head of the family was recognized by the
court although he and the claimant were not related by blood or
marriage and were living in a boarding house at the time of his injury
and death.
These two cases present an interesting contrast. In Cowden's
Case, a blood relative was disqualified as a dependent partly because
her dependent father and next of kin-survived. The father, however,
was not a blood relative of the employee; the father had married the
employee's mother when the employee was a child and later adopted
the employee. In Peterson's Case, a non-relative qualified as a depend-
ent (member of employee's family) although the employee's mother
and next of kin survived him. If there is a moral obligation to support
a non-relative, as in Peterson's Case, there certainly is a moral obli-
gation to support a half-brother, as in O'Flynn's Case."
Peterson's Case, perhaps, represents the outside limit to which
the court will go in finding a moral obligation to support as a basis
for awarding dependency compensation. Roney's Case" is just over
the line. There the claimant was the divorced wife of the employee's
cousin. The claimant was not well and had to give up working. She
was in need of support for herself and her children. The employee
set up a home in which he supported her • and her children for
"undefined periods." They lived thus for twenty-seven years. On
the findings there was no illicit relationship, so this was not the
reason for denying compensation. The court said that the facts did
not warrant a finding that the employee assumed an obligation to
support on a ground favored by the law. Although the obligation to
support was voluntary in both Peterson and Roney, the employee in
Peterson's Case had a moral obligation in view of the care and sup-
port the claimant had provided for him when he was growing up.
There was no similar or comparable past history in Roney.
The fact that the employee in Roney, having undertaken the
obligation, maintained it for twenty-seven years and behaved in many
respects as family head, was insufficient to elevate the undertaking
to the level of a moral obligation. In her testimony, the claimant said
that "she thought it was a pretty good proposition when she went to
live with Mr. Roney to have him supply a home and give her the
money. It was contemplated that she would manage the household
48 232 Mass. 582, 122 N.E. 767 (1919).
49 316 Mass. 732, 56 N.E.2d 859 (1944).
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and he would have a home."'" The court held, "Mt would not follow
that her position was other than that of a housekeeper!" 61
Where there is no kinship and no obligation to support "on a
ground favored by the law," there is usually found a housekeeper-
boarder relationship as in Roney and Moore." In Herrick's Case," on
the other hand, a daughter, who frankly became a housekeeper for
her father, was found to be his dependent. When his wife died, his
daughter, who was well capable of earning a living, gave up a good
job to take care of him. She thus became a dependent and his obliga-
tion to support her under these circumstances overrides her frank
undertaking of the housekeeper's role." Here the family unit was
maintained and the obligation of the father to support was therefore
"on a ground favored by the law" as contrasted with relationships
contrary to public policy, as in Moore," or voluntary, mutually con-
venient relationships as in Roney" and Mahoney," where the claim-
ant was neither next of kin to the employee nor a member of his
family.
Where a parent does not qualify as a conclusive dependent upon
a minor child, the obligation of the child to support the parent is
based on the rule that the parent is legally entitled to the wages of
the minor child."
D. Claimant Must Be in Need of Employee's Support
Though proof that a person could not have subsisted with-
out aid from the employee is not essential to establish the
existence of a relation of dependency . . . , dependency im-
plies some degree of need."
50 Id. at 741, 56 N.E.2d at 865.
91 Id. at 743, 56 N.E.2d at 865-66.
62 Moore's Case, supra note 28. See also Mahoney's Case, 228 Mass. 555, 117 N.E.
794 (1917) (employee lived with sister and her son).
53 217 Mass. 111, 104 N.E. 432 (1914).
54 The father had the obligation to support his daughter who was his next of kin
and a member of his family; the daughter needed suppoit having given up her liveli-
hood to discharge her filial duty. See also Kenney's Case, 222 Mass. 401, 111 N.E. 47
(1916) (the court found an obligation to support a sister who gave up her job to keep
house for her brother).
55 Supra note 28.
56 Supra note 49.
5T Supra note 52.
68 Sanborn's Case, 303 Mass. 225, 21 N.E.2d 248 (1939); Cammick's Case, 259
Mass. 209, 155 N.E. 870 (1927); Dembinski's Case, 231 Mass. 261, 120 N.E. 856 (1918);
Cove's Case, 223 Mass. 187, 111 N.E. 702 (1916); Tornroos v. Auto Car Co., 220
Mass. 336, 107 NE. 1015 (1915); Murphy's Case, 218 Mass. 278, 105 N.E. 635 (1914).
59 Ferriter's Case, 269 Mass. 267, 270, 168 N.E. 747, 748 (1929). See also Mosesso's
Case, 327 Mass. 525, 99 N.E.2d 859 (1951); Hoehn's Case, 326 Mass. 509, 95 N.E.2d
550 (1950); Connors's Case, 295 Mass. 106, 3 N.E.2d 31 (1936); Cammick's Case, supra
note 58; Fierro's Case, 223 Mass. 378, 111 N.E. 957 (1916); Caliendo's Case, 219 Mass.
498, 107 N.E. 370 (1914).
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A daughter, over eighteen but physically incapacitated, could
certainly show need and total dependency although she had saved
one hundred dollars and had worked for two weeks in a period of
three years prior to the employee's death." Even a thirty-one year
old unmarried daughter, who, after working for eight years, lost her
job about a year prior to her father's death qualified as a dependent."
A sister of a deceased employee qualified as a partial dependent al-
though she had a substantial bank account and an interest in produc-
tive real estate."
However, dependency on the employee for business expenses or
for payment of employee's board is not sufficient to meet the "need"
requirement." Nor may a claimant ". . . refrain from the use of re-
sources, including the ability to work, reasonably available to him for
his support under all the circumstances of the case and thereby make
himself 'dependent' upon the person who actually supports him.""
Providing money for a college education is not of itself support
and, consequently, does not alone meet the need requirement in deter-
mining dependency." However, money for a vacation can be part of
support and, hence, can be a factor in establishing the need require-
ment."
E. Dependency Must Rest Upon Employee's Earnings
The claimant must be ". . . dependent upon the earnings of the
employee. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)" Support of the dependent
must come from the earnings of the employee and not from any other
assets or income of the employee in order for the claimant to qualify
for benefits."
Where total dependency is in issue, the house in which the claim-
ant lives must be shown by affirmative evidence to be maintained out
of the earnings of the employee." Even if the employee built a house
and paid taxes for it out of his earnings, the ownership of the house
in his wife's name has been held to destroy her total dependency
60 Carter's Case, 221 Mass. 105, 108 N.E. 911 (1915).
81 Herbert's Case, 283 Mass. 348, 186 N.E. 554 (1933).
62 Kenney's Case, supra note 54.
ell Merchant's Case, 282 Mass. 36, 184 N.E. 390 (1933); Doherty's Case, 277
Mass. 339, 178 N.E. 515 (1931).
64 Ferriter's Case, supra note 59, at 270-71, 168 N.E. at 748. See also DiClavio's
Case, supra note 40.
65 DiClavio's Case, supra note 40.
oe Ressi's Case, 243 Mass. 528, 137 N.E. 703 (1923).
07 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 1(3) (1932).
68 Merchant's Case, supra note 63; Derinza's Case, 229 Mass. 435, 118 N.E. 942
(1918); Gorski's Case, supra note 41.
611 Diana's Case 335 Mass. 757, 142 N.E.2d 358 (1957); Cellurale's Case, 333
Mass. 37, 127 N.E.2d 787 (1955); Derinza's Case, supra note 68.
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status." Although she can still qualify as a partial dependent, this
latter result does seem harsh where nominal ownership of property is
involved.
VI. NON-RESIDENT ALIENS
Whether non-resident aliens are eligible for dependency benefits
was decided for the first time on its merits in Derinza's Case.' There
had previously been at least three cases before the court in which
eligibility of non-resident aliens was assumed without the question
having been raised." Derinza's Case expressly settled the matter:
"There is in the words of our act no exclusion from its benefits of
those dependents who are non-resident aliens. . . .""
Although nothing is said in our Act regarding either inclusion or
exclusion of non-resident aliens, the holding in Derinza's Case follows
the general intent of the drafters of the original Act. In a legislative
document prepared in 1910 for the purpose of explaining to the public
what benefits would be available and who would be eligible, the orig-
inal drafters of the Act wrote: "Non-resident aliens shall be en-
titled to payments as dependents of a deceased employee!'" The speci-
fic reference to dependents of a "deceased" employee in this early
document is understandable in view of the fact that the provision
for benefits to dependents of injured employees was not enacted un-
til 1945.
VII. CONCLUSIVE DEPENDENTS
A. General Summary
It has already been pointed out that conclusively presumed de-
pendents were provided for under the law to reduce litigation and to
grant dependency benefits to those normally dependent upon the em-
ployee without requiring proof of their dependency." But the question
whether claimants in various situations qualify as conclusive de-
pendents has itself been a fruitful source of litigation.
All the provisions for benefits to dependents of injured em-
ployees appear in section 35A, including the provisions for conclusive
dependency. Provisions for dependents of deceased employees appear
in sections 31 and 32. Section 31 generally provides for the benefits to
be paid, and section 32 designates those who are to receive benefits
and includes the provisions for conclusive dependency. Sections 31 and
70 McDonald's Case, 229 Mass. 454, 118 N.E. 949 (1918).
n Supra note 68.
72 Gorski's Case, supra note 41; Fierro's Case, supra note 59; Caliendo's Case,
supra note 59.
73 Supra note 68, at 441, 118 N.E. at 945.
74 Tentative Synopsis and Draft of a Proposed Act Providing for Payments in
Case of Accidents to Employees (December 17, 1910).
75 See text accompanying note 3, supra.
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32 must be read together. Conclusive dependency ". . . is not affected
by the wealth or poverty of the dependent.'
Persons designated as conclusive dependents are the same under
the provisions of section 32 for deceased employees and section 35A
for injured employees:
(1) A wife upon a husband with whom she lives at the time of his
injury (35A) or his death (32);
(2) A husband (under certain conditions discussed below) upon a
wife with whom he lives at the time of her injury (35A) or
her death (32);
(3) Children under eighteen (or over eighteen if physically or
mentally incapacitated) living with the employee at the time
of his (or her)" injury (35A) or death (32);
(4) A parent upon an unmarried child under eighteen.
B. Conclusive Dependents Exclude Dependents in Fact
The rule was established early in workmen's compensation his-
tory in Massachusetts that a conclusive dependent takes to the ex-
clusion of a dependent in fact." The statute as originally passed
provided in what is now section 31" that dependency compensation
be paid to ". . . the dependents of the employee, wholly dependent
upon his earnings for support." This would appear to mean that all
those wholly dependent were entitled to compensation. There ap-
peared, however, to be qualifying provisions in section 32. After set-
ting forth who shall be conclusive dependents, the last paragraph of
section 32 reads in part as follows:
In all other cases questions of dependency, in whole or in
part, shall be determined in accordance with the fact as the
fact may be at the time of the injury ... ; and in such other
cases, if there is more than one person wholly dependent
the death benefit shall be divided equally among them. . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)
It was only in section 32 and in the context of "such other cases,"
that is, dependents in fact, that provision was made for an equal divi-
sion. Reading these two original sections together it was, therefore,
not clear whether the legislative intent was to divide equally the de-
7° Cronin's Case, 234 Mass. 5, 6, 124 N.E. 669, 670 (1919).
77 Use of the word "his" in the statute, unless clearly limited in context to
masculine also includes the feminine. Brown's Case, 322 Mass. 429, 430, 77 N.E.2d 649,
650 (1948), citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 4, § 6 (1932).
78 McNicol's Case, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697 (1913); Coakley's Case, 216 Mass.
71, 102 N.E. 930 (1913).
70 Section numbers used herein refer to the earlier (and differently numbered) as
well as to the present sections.
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pendency benefits only among dependents in fact. If this was the in-
tent, what was to be done about a case with two or more conclusive
dependents?
Under the original statutea child under eighteen was a conclusive
dependent if there was no surviving parent. Nor was there any provi-
sion until 1922 for paying a surviving widow any additional sum for
children of the employee. Thus, in McNicol's Case," where a widow
and her child survived, the question of dependency benefits for the
child was raised for the first time. The widow was clearly a conclusive
dependent under section 32. The child was just as clearly not a con-
clusive dependent under the same section. The child could no doubt
qualify as a total dependent in fact. The court held that where there
was a surviving husband or wife, he or she was a conclusive dependent
and no one else shared in the dependency benefits. The resulting gen-
eral rule was that where there was a conclusive dependent, dependents
in fact were excluded from benefits.
In McNicol's Case the court reasoned that the conclusively de-
pendent parent excluded the dependent-in-fact child because in other
parts of the statute (sections 31 and 33) the . . use of the plural
word 'dependents' finds ample justification in the many conceivable
instances where several persons may be entitled to share in the pay-
ments where there is no surviving husband or wife." The court did
not consider, however, the possibility of an orphaned child who might
qualify as a conclusive dependent of the deceased employee even when
he leaves a wife. The child in such a case would be the issue of a
former marriage, the former wife having predeceased the employee.
There would thus be both a surviving wife and an orphaned child,
both of whom would qualify as conclusive dependents. This is pre-
cisely what happened in Coakley's Case s' shortly after the decision
in McNicol's Case. Here the issue was sharply raised as to division
between two conclusive dependents.
The widow in Coakley's Case had two children of her own by
her former marriage. These children could qualify as members of the
employee's family and dependents in fact, but not as conclusive de-
pendents. There was also a surviving child of the widow and the de-
ceased employee who, like the child in McNicol's Case, could qualify
as a dependent in fact, but not as a conclusive dependent. Finally
there was a child of the employee by a former marriage who was living
with the employee at the time of his death (the mother of the child
having predeceased the employee). Under the statute, this latter child
and the widow were both conclusive dependents. The court, relying
8° Supra note 78.
81 Supra note 78.
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on McNicol, held that the conclusive dependents exclude the depend-
ents in fact. It then proceeded to divide the benefits between the
widow and the child despite the gap in the statute regarding division
among conclusive dependents and despite the formulation in McNicol
that others share only "where there is no surviving husband or wife."
The court in Coakley's Case pointed out that there was no express
statutory provision for sharing benefits among conclusive dependents
and then justified the division between the mother and the orphaned
child:
It is true that no express provision is made for a case like
the present where there is more than one person beside or-
phaned children conclusively presumed to be wholly depend-
ent. But the act should be interpreted broadly in harmony
with its main aim of providing support for those dependent
upon a deceased employee. Reading the section as a whole
the purpose appears to be, though disclosed in language not
completely free from obscurity, to divide the payments
equally among those conclusively presumed to be wholly
dependent. This is manifest by express words when there
are two or more orphaned children. Equal division is pro-
vided also when, in case there is no one conclusively pre-
sumed to be wholly dependent and dependency is determined
as a fact, more than one is found to be wholly dependents'
In summary, Coakley's Case argues that the statute should be
interpreted broadly to provide benefits for dependents; that section
32 used the plural word "children" in sub-paragraph (c) and is thus
an express provision for sharing benefits among conclusive depend-
ents at least in that category; that equal division is provided for when
there are several dependents in fact and that the statute, therefore,
was intended to provide that where there are two or more conclusive
dependents in any category they should share benefits despite the
absence of any express statutory provision to this effect.
While agreeing that all conclusive dependents should share, based
on a broad interpretation of the statute, it seems reasonable to argue,
based on the same broad interpretation, that the legislature intended
under the original statute that all persons wholly dependent whether
conclusive or in fact, should share equally in the death benefits. Sec-
tion 31 said simply that death benefits should be paid to those wholly
dependent. The only difference between conclusive dependents and
dependents in fact is that the latter must, and the former need not,
prove their dependency. The only reason for establishing a category
82 Coakley's Case, supra note 78, at 73, 102 N.E. at 931-32.
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of conclusive dependents is to avoid litigation." It does not seem
reasonable to exclude dependents in fact merely because they must
prove their dependency. That dependents in fact are referred to in
section 32 as "other cases" and "such other cases" may have been
nothing more than the result of the rhetorical necessity of identifying
two separate dependency categories. While it is true that section 32
appears in "language not completely free from obscurity," it is also
true that the legislature in that section expressly excluded partial
dependents when total dependents survived. This is the only express
exclusion in the statute. If it so intended, the legislature could just
as easily have inserted an express exclusion for dependents in fact
when conclusive dependents survived. Furthermore, the legislature,
by the use of the plural, clearly implied division of benefits for con-
clusively dependent "children" under section 32(c). Since there was
still no express provision for division among all categories of con-
clusive dependents, even though the court in Coakley's Case found
legislative intent to do so, it would seem just as reasonable to say that
the legislature intended division among all total dependents, conclusive
and in fact.
It is difficult to understand why one who is designated a con-
clusive dependent should enjoy greater rights than one who is equally,
and perhaps more, dependent although designated "dependent in fact."
Indeed, it may even be more logical to conclude that one who is put
to the task and successfully proves total dependency should enjoy at
least as much right under the statute as a conclusively presumed de-
pendent who may in fact not be at all a dependent in the literal sense
of that word.
In any event, the twofold holding in Coakley's Case was clear.
The mother and orphan were both conclusive dependents and, as such,
they shared in the benefits. There were also children in that case who
were dependents in fact who did not share because the conclusive
dependents excluded them. The exclusionary rule was thus established.
The practical effect of Coakley's Case was to give to the widow
five dollars per week for herself and her child by the employee and
to give to the employee's child of a former marriage five dollars
for herself." The distribution was obviously inequitable. In 1914, the
following year, the statute was amended to enact the holding in
Coakley's Case that conclusive dependents should share. To remedy
the inequitable distribution in that case the amendment also provided
that the spouse, the children of the spouse and the employee, and the
employee's children of a former marriage should all share the benefits
equally, the surviving wife or husband to take the same share as a
83 Report of Commission on Compensation for Industrial Accidents (July 1, 1912).
84
 The maximum for dependents was then a total of ten dollars weekly.
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child. Under this provision the widow and the child by the employee in
Coakley's Case would each have received one-third of the dependency
benefits (instead of one-quarter) and the orphan the remaining third.
The 1914 amendment had the appearance of implementing the
exclusion of dependents in fact by conclusive dependents. It provided,
"The death benefit shall be divided between the surviving wife or
husband and all the children of the deceased employee." This could
perhaps mean that the entire death benefit should thus be divided,
leaving nothing for "all other cases" i.e., dependents in fact. On the
other hand, this new amendment, under the rubric of conclusive
dependents, provided for sharing by children of the employee who
were not conclusive dependents with those who were (the surviving
parent and children of a former marriage). The wording of section
32(c) makes it clear that the children of the employee living with him
are conclusive dependents only if there is no surviving parent. In other
words, they are not conclusive dependents when a parent survives, but
they do share in benefits when there are conclusively dependent chil-
dren of a former marriage. Thus, the 1914 amendment in effect ig-
nored the boundaries between the different dependency categories in
order to accomplish a just result.
In 1922 another significant amendment was enacted, this time to
section 31. This amendment generally provided additional benefits to
the widow up to a certain maximum when there were children, under
eighteen, of the widow and the deceased employee. Again, as in 1914,
the 1922 amendment had a double aspect. The increasing differences
in the benefit payment provision between conclusive and in-fact
dependents could be said to confirm the legislative intent that they
should be separate categories and that the one should exclude the
other. On the other hand, it was again clear, as it was in 1914, that
benefit payments were being provided for children who were not con-
clusive dependents, along with benefit payments for the conclusively
dependent widow. Furthermore, the 1922 amendment enacted the
rule in Bartoni's Case' in which the court, without benefit of express
statutory authority, awarded compensation to a child to succeed a
deceased widow who had been receiving dependency benefits. The
court in Bartoni's Case held that the child of a deceased widow takes
as if he were the only surviving next of kin. This is language applicable
to dependency in fact rather than conclusive dependency.
In a word, the 1914 amendment, Bartoni's Case and its enactment
into the 1922 amendment were all designed to achieve a more equi-
table payment and distribution of benefits among dependents regard-
less of rigid categories. This is consistent with the benevolent purpose
85 225 Mass. 349, 114 N.E. 663 (1961). The rule in Bartoni's Case followed the
dictum in Murphy's Case, 224 Mass. 592, 113 N.E. 283 (1916).
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of the statute; the exclusionary rule in favor of conclusive dependents
is not.
Many states apparently follow the exclusionary rule in one form
or another." The better rule, permitting a just division of benefits
among dependency categories, is applied in some states either by stat-
ute or decision. In Kentucky, for example, with dependency provisions
very much like those in Massachusetts and without express statutory
authority, it has been held repeatedly that dependency benefits may
be apportioned among the several dependency categories. As between
conclusive and total dependents in fact, the benefits are equally di-
vided." As between partial and total dependents, the division is on
the basis of the proportion of earnings contributed to the partial de-
pendents.88
If the employee was, in his lifetime, contributing to the
support of more than one dependent of different degrees,
why should his death work a preference in favor of one or of
a single class to the exclusion of all others, provided they all
come within one or the other of the classes named in the
act?"
California and Ohio exemplify states with statutory provisions
allowing their compensation commissions to reapportion death benefits
among dependency categories as may be just and equitable and in
accordance with needs."
C. Conclusive Dependency of Wives and Widows
1. Generally
Under section 32(a), a widow is a conclusive dependent if she
was living with the employee at the time of his death. It is no impedi-
ment to her qualifications as a conclusive dependent if her marriage
was invalid when it took place, but became valid prior to the employee's
death by operation of the law of marriage and divorce 81
 The widow
is also a conclusive dependent under section 32(a) if she was living
apart for justifiable cause or because her husband had deserted her.
This latter provision is apparently based on the theory that during
86 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 6430 (1952); 9 Schneider, Work-
men's Compensation Law § 1907 (1950).
87 Ritchie v. Katy Coal Co., 313 Ky. 310, 231 S.W.2d 57 (1950); Franklin Fluor-
spar Co. v. Bell, 247 Ky. 507, 57 S.W.2d 481 (1933).
88 J. F. Ilardymon Co. v. Kan, 241 Ky. 252, 43 S.W.2d 678 (1931); Noe v. Noe,
229 Ky. 490, 17 S.W.2d 405 (1929).
89 Penn v. Penn, 183 Ky. 228, 232, 209 S.W. 53, 55 (1919).
90 Cal. Lab. Code § 4704; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4123.59 (Baldwin Supp. 1963).
91 Van Bibber's Case, 343 Mass. 443, 179 N.E.2d 253 (1962); Craddock's Case,
310 Mass. 116, 37 N.E.2d 508 (1941); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 207, § 6 (1932).
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his lifetime and until his death he was under a continuing obligation
to support which the wife could, presumably, enforce through the
courts. Until the employee's death, the wife would, in this sense,
be a dependent although living apart and not receiving support. It
would be unfair to deprive her permanently of this dependency status
upon his death.
On the other hand, under section 35A, the wife of an injured em-
ployee does not qualify as a conclusive dependent if living apart from
her husband for any reason at the time of the injury. Here the wife
continues to have her legal remedies against her injured husband
(e.g., separate support) and, furthermore, she may, under the last
paragraph of section 35A, secure direct dependency payments after
establishing herself as a dependent in fact. Presumably this provision
for separate dependency benefits and her other legal remedies were
considered by the legislature sufficient protection for the wife without
the need for granting her conclusive dependency status, even in cases
of desertion and living apart for justifiable cause when the husband
survives and is collecting compensation. It would seem just as reason-
able, however, to grant conclusive dependency in these circumstances,
as in death cases, instead of placing upon the wife the heavier burden
of proving dependency in fact. Wives, deserted or living apart for
just cause, who must prove dependency in fact may be unfairly ex-
cluded if there is another conclusive dependent [e.g., a child under
section 35A(c)] or may find it impossible to prove all the necessary
elements of dependency in fact. Such a wife could, presumably, be
called upon to prove contributions from her husband's earnings"
when his refusal to meet his obligation to support her was precisely
the reason for her living apart.
In any event, when there is clearly a separation between an
injured employee and his wife, she does not qualify as a conclusive
dependent, but may qualify as a dependent in fact." Where there are
only temporary separations due to moving, travel or other transient
reasons not basically causing a break or interruption in the marriage
and mutual home, the same rules apply to wives of injured employees
as apply to widows."
2. Widows as Conclusive Dependents
The original enactment of section 32(a) simply provided con-
clusive dependency of a widow who was living with the employee
at the time of his death. Gallagher's Case" raised for the first time
92 See Part V, B and E, supra.
95 Newman's Case, 222 Mass. 563, 111 N.E.359 (1916).
94 See this part, section 5, infra.
95 219 Mass. 140, 106 N.E. 558 (1914).
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the question of conclusive dependency status for a widow who was
living apart from her husband for justifiable cause and receiving sup-
port under a court order. The original statute said simply and clearly
"with whom she lives at the time of his death." Thus, the court had
no choice but to hold that there was no conclusive dependency. Within
less than two years, in 1914, the legislature added the present provision
in section 32(a) that a widow living apart for justifiable cause or be-
cause she was deserted qualifies for conclusive dependency.
The justice of the new provision was obvious. Widows covered
by the provision were spared the burden of proving dependency in
fact by being entitled to the preferred conclusive dependency status.
But now these widows had a new burden: to prove that they were
deserted or were living apart for just cause; this created a new body
of law.
The importance for the widow living apart to secure conclusive
dependency status is that otherwise she has to prove dependency in
fact and also the degree of her dependency, whether total or partial.
If she is not a conclusive dependent she may be entirely excluded
if there is a conclusive dependent in the picture, for example, a child
by a former marriage." If there is no conclusive dependent, and she
can show only partial dependency, she might be completely excluded
by the presence of total dependents in fact, for example, a totally
dependent mother, under the last paragraph of section 32.
There is, therefore, a high premium on proving conclusive de-
pendency. Where the widow living apart cannot show desertion or
just cause, she can qualify as a conclusive dependent only if she can
show that although not living with the employee at his death, the
separation was temporary or one more apparent than real, and that
there was really a "home with a life in it."" •
Thus, two lines of cases have followed the 1914 amendment to
section 32(a): cases involving "justifiable cause" and "desertion" and
cases involving the definition of "separation" or "living apart."
3. Living Apart for Justifiable Cause or Desertion
It is necessary to show affirmatively that there was a living apart
for just cause or desertion and the burden is on the claimant widow."
The first case to come before the court under the new provision for
justifiable cause was Newman's Case. The court made it clear at the
outset that:
96 Coakley's Case, supra note 78.
97 Nelson's Case, 217 Mass. 467, 469, 105 N.E. 357, 359 (1914).
98 Shaw's Case, 340 Mass. 717, 166 N.E.2d 718 (1960) ; Cellurale's Case, supra
note 69; Allen's Case, 318 Mass. 640, 63 N.E.2d 356 (1945) ; Craddock's Case, supra
note 91; DiClavio's Case, 293 Mass. 259, 199 N.E. 732 (1936) ; Fierro's Case, supra
note 59.
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These words have acquired a peculiar and appropriate mean-
ing in the law. . . . [S]he does not live apart from him for
justifiable cause if there is no failure of marital duty on his
part."
Here there was a separation by mutual agreement because the em-
ployee did not earn enough to support his wife and provide a home,
but his earnings at his death had doubled, yet they still lived apart.
DiClavio's Case'" was similarly a case of living apart by mutual con-
sent for financial reasons, and this, the court said, was not a failure
of marital duty and not a separation for just cause. In Newman's Case
the rule is certainly understandable particularly because the em-
ployee was earning twice as much as at the time of separation. In
DiClavio's Case the rule is clearly applicable on two grounds: the em-
ployee and his wife (who remained in Italy) had been separated about
twenty-four years at his death, the original separation being by mutual
consent for financial reasons, and the wife did not sustain the burden
of proving separation for just cause at the time of death. But where
the wife separates from her husband, as in Veber's Case," because the
employee is physically and mentally incapable of performing remu-
nerative work to provide for wife and child, the application of the rule
in Newman's Case seems harsh. There would appear to be more than
merely a mutual agreement to separate for financial reasons in Veber's
Case; there would seem to be something more accurately described as
a failure of marital duty. The court evidently considered it necessary,
however, to apply the Newman rule narrowly. It almost appears neces-
sary to show an intentional refusal by the employee to fulfill his
marital duty in order for the widow to sustain a claim of desertion or
justifiable cause.
The original separation by the wife from the employee need not
have been for justifiable cause; the widow may claim just cause if it
arises during the separation and if she shows that this cause was the
reason for continued separation at the employee's death. In DiClavio's
Case"' the husband left the wife in Italy in 1909 for financial reasons
and by mutual consent. They never saw each other again and he
died twenty-four years later in 1933. Meanwhile, about a year or two
after arriving in this country, he met another woman and lived with
her intermittently for about twenty-two years until his death. Within
two years after he started living with her, they had an illegitimate son.
The court said in effect that if the legal wife could sustain the burden
of proving that her husband's subsequent adultery was the reason for
99 Supra note 93, at 566-67, 111 N.E. at 361.
100 293 Mass. 259, 199 N.E. 732 (1936).
101 224 Mass. 86, 112 N.E. 485 (1916).
102 Supra note 100.
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continuing living apart, she would thereby show just cause and qualify
as a conclusive dependent.
The same general proposition was set forth in Broadbent's Case.'
In this case the wife had refused to accompany her husband from
England to the United States. They lived apart for twenty years
until his death and the wife made no effort to communicate with her
husband during this period. Her reason for refusing to accompany him
was that prior to his departure, he had improper relations with other
women, struck her, ill-treated her and earned too little to support the
family. She had continued to live with him, however, and the board
found condonation; the court affirmed the finding. Added to all this,
however, the wife had said she would accompany him to this country
if he would alter his ways, and he replied that he would do as he saw
fit. There was also the even more important allegation that the wife
discovered in 1906, approximately nine years after his departure, that
he had entered into a bigamous marriage. On all of these facts, and
particularly her discovery of his bigamous marriage, the court said that,
if believed, it could have been found that she was living apart for
justifiable cause. The board apparently chose not to believe that she
had discovered his bigamous marriage prior to his death or that she
continued to live apart because of it, and the court could not say, as
a matter of law, that the findings of the board were erroneous. Both
DiClavio and Broadbent indicate the need for substantial and con-
vincing evidence to prove just cause arising after initial separation
without just cause.
The wife's behavior after being deserted or after leaving her
husband for just cause may be relevant on the question whether at the
time of his death she was still living apart for desertion or just cause.
The insurer will, of course, raise the question of the wife's behavior
when it might tend to show that living apart from her husband at his
death was motivated by interests other than his desertion or her just
cause for separation.'" Specifically, the situation may be one in which
the wife has a good claim for conclusive dependency based on just
cause or desertion, but there is ample credible evidence that she was
guilty of adultery prior to his death. We find no decided cases that
raise the issue directly, but Thurman's Case" at least suggests the
factual situation. The wife in that case had left her husband, taking
their young daughter with her, because he had refused to support them.
At the time of the employee's death, the wife was living in adultery.
The daughter claimed as a conclusive dependent under section 32(d)
103 240 Mass. 449, 134 N.E. 632 (1922).
104 At the present writing there is just such a case being litigated before the In-
dustrial Accident Board.
1" 259 Mass. 222, 156 N.E. 28 (192)).
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on the ground that her father was legally bound to support her al-
though they were living apart; the board so found. The wife in
Thurman's Case did not make a claim for dependency, although she
had originally separated from her husband for just cause. So far as
the husband's behavior alone was concerned there was nothing to
preclude the wife's status as a conclusive dependent if she had filed
a claim. So far as the wife was concerned she would not be benefited
because of her illicit conduct, but rather, because of her husband's
conduct constituting just cause for leaving him. The public policy
which prevents a wrongdoer from participating in the benefits of the
Act would thus not apply here:" The question would then resolve
itself to the factual one of whether she was living apart for the initial
just cause or the current adulterous relationship. If the wife offered
credible evidence, which was believed by the board, tending to prove
that, entirely apart from her admitted misconduct, she was prepared
to return to her husband at any time until his death, it seems that an
award of conclusive dependency would have to stand as a matter of
law. There seems to be no legal reason to the contrary;especially
in view of the express statutory provision in section 32(a) that the
board's findings in such matters are final 10T
4. Findings of the Board Are Final
The final sentence in section 32(a) reads as follows: "The findings
of the [Industrial Accident Board] . . . upon the questions of such
justifiable cause and desertion shall be final." The purpose and effect
of this statutory provision is not entirely clear, unless it means that the
board's findings on these questions will somehow be given more than
ordinary recognition. The court in Broadbent's Case"' makes a ref-
erence to this provision, thus recognizing its existence, and then adds
that there must be evidence to support the board's findings. It is ax-
iomatic that the board's findings under any section of the act must
stand if there is any evidence to support them?"
5. "Living Apart" Defined
When the wife is not living with the employee at his death and
there is clearly no separation for just cause or desertion, the wife
must show that there was only a temporary living apart, or infrequent
toe Moore's Case, 294 Mass. 557, 3 N.E.2d 5 (1936); Gritta's Case, 236 Mass.
204, 127 N.E. 889 (1920).
191 "Misconduct after the abandonment would not bar her right to participate
in the award as his wife." Ritchie v. Katy Coal Co., supra note 87, at 314, 231 S.W.2d
at 59.
es Supra note 103.
109 This rule is repeated in innumerable compensation cases. See, e.g., Pigeon's Case,
216 Mass. 51, 52, 102 N.E. 932, 933 (1913).
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separations involving family necessity and that there was, overall,
a living together within the meaning of the statute.
Living together means maintaining a family relationship.
There may be temporary absences and incidental interrup-
tions arising out of changes in the house or town of residence,
or out of travel for business or pleasure. But there must be
a home and a life in it."°
A living together . . . imports actual enjoyment of the mar-
riage relation.... It cannot be stretched to include prolonged
absences... .111
Both sections 32(a), for conclusive dependency of the wife of a
deceased employee, and 35A(a), for conclusive dependency of the
wife of an injured employee, use the same phrase "with whom she
lives" and the same standards of "living together," no doubt, apply to
both types of cases. The same standards also apply to "with whom
he is living," in section 35A(b), and to "with whom he lives," in
section 32(b), with respect to husbands as conclusively presumed
dependents.
A separation for about seven months with unknown sums sent by
the employee on two occasions to the wife who was running a farm in
a foreign country where she had hired a man to help on the farm, was
not a living together as contemplated by section 32(a). 112 When the
separation lasts over thirteen months there is also no living together,
even though there is a genuine purpose to resume cohabitation."'
Certainly a separation of about three and a half years from the wife in
a foreign country is too long to justify a "living together" and con-
clusive dependency. 114
Thus, as a general rule, prolonged absence is not a "living to-
gether" under the statute. This general rule must, however, be tem-
pered by a reasonable recognition of life's exigencies and the demands
of economics, health and marital duty. There must also be a recogni-
tion of the basic purpose of providing benefits to dependents and that
denying a wife conclusive dependency may deprive her of any depend-
ency if there is a conclusive dependent in the picture, even if the
wife is in fact dependent.
Having separated for financial reasons and continuing to live
separately, although the husband earns twice as much at his death,
110 Nelson's Case, supra note 97, at 469, 105 N.E. at 358.
111 McDonald's Case, supra note 70, at 455, 118 N.E. at 950.
112 Gorski's Case, 227 Mass. 456, 116 N.E. 811 (1917).
113 McDonald's Case, supra note 70.
114 Mooradjian's Case, 229 Mass. 521, 118 N.E.951 (1918).
115 Newman's Case, supra note 93.
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is certainly not a living together. 115 Similarly, in Breakey's Case,'
where the employee lives with his mother since his marriage, main-
tains a household for her and gives her money, and where his wife
lives apart and works there is, obviously, no living together, even
though he gives his wife a weekly sum. Here the mother defeated the
wife's claim for conclusive dependency and they both qualified as
partial dependents in fact. But where the husband, as in Allen's
Case,'" finds it necessary to work in another city and returns week-
ends to his family, there is not a living apart and there is a conclusive
dependency for the wife. In. Gilson's Case"8
 the employee lived in
harmony with his wife for three years before his death, spent three
days of every weekend with her and had supper and breakfast with
her daily. Four nights each week he stayed with his aged and infirm
mother who lived alone and took care of her by making her fires and
preparing her breakfast. Here there was also a living together and
conclusive dependency for, the wife.
Harrington's Case" falls somewhere between the latter situation
and Breakey's Case,"° in which the original ceremony and weekly
payments to the wife were the only things left of the marriage. In
Harrington the husband and wife spent weekends together, but each
worked and had separate abodes in different cities. The wife would
have lived with her husband if he had steady work and could pay the
bills. "The 'home and a life in it,' however, approached the vanishing
point. But it could have been found that there was still a 'matrimonial
abode'. . .
In Lopes' Case" the husband was the claimant. He was totally
disabled and, with his wife's consent, lived in the Cape Verde Islands.
He had been living there for about ten months. Before her death he
arranged to return to the family home which she had maintained
during his absence. "Here it could be found that there was 'a home
and a life in it' which was carried on in Falmouth by the wife during
the temporary absence of her husband because of illness." 123
In summary, Allen's Case says that economic necessity causing
brief separation is not a living apart; Harrington's Case, one involving
economic necessity and two separate abodes, holds that the standard
of living together was barely met by the weekends spent together;
Gilson's Case says that brief separations because. of filial duty is
In 235 Mass. 460, 126 N.E. 769 (1920).
Supra note 98.
118 254 Mass. 460, 150 N.E. 183 (1926).
n 9 297 Mass. 125, 7 N.E.2d 732 (1937).
120 Supra note 116.
121 Harrington's Case, supra note 119, at 128, 7 N.E.2d at 733.
122 332 Mass. 39, 123 N.E.2d 217 (1954).
128 Id. at 41, 123 N.E.2d at 218.
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not a living apart; finally, there is not a living apart even after a
separation for ten months due to illness when a home was being main-
tained and plans were made for rejoining the home, as in Lopes'
Case.
D. Husbands as Conclusive Dependents
The surviving husband is a conclusive dependent of the deceased
wife (employee) under section 32(b) provided he lives with her at
the time of her death.
Although husbands are not normally dependent upon their wives
and thus might not be expected to come within the theory of con-
clusive dependency, the legislature, in this instance, grants the wife
who shares in the breadwinning function the same employee status
as the husband. The legislature no doubt had in mind that where
the wife has to leave home to work, there is generally a need for and
a dependency upon her earnings, and when the working wife dies,
there is both a permanent loss of her earnings and an additional
financial burden upon her husband in providing for management and
maintenance of the family. When the wife leaves home and subjects
herself to the risks of industry it is reasonable to require industry to
insure her loss to the family.
Under section 35A (h), dealing with injured employees, a husband
qualifies as a conclusive dependent only if he is mentally or physically
incapacitated. When the wife is an injured employee, she receives
compensation for both herself and her children under section 35A(c).
The need for providing conclusive dependency status to the husband
(if he is not incapacitated) does not exist as it does in the case of a
deceased wife.
E. Children as Conclusive Dependents
1. Generally
Section 32(c) provides that children under eighteen living with
the employee at his death are conclusive dependents if there is no
surviving parent. 124
 Under the same section, orphaned children of
a former marriage are also conclusive dependents even if the employee
leaves a wife.
Injured employees were not entitled to any benefits for their
dependents until 1945. In that year section 35A was enacted, applying
the provisions of section 32 to injured employees. Section 35A provides
conclusive dependency for children living with or apart from the em-
ployee at the time of his injury. This provision corresponds to sections
32(c) and 32(d) relating to children of deceased employees.
124 The child must be under eighteen at the employee's death and does not qualify
if he reaches eighteen between injury and death. Ressi's Case, 240 Mass. 136, 133 N.E.
566 (1921).
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To qualify as a child under sections 32 and 35A, a person must
be under eighteen or, if over eighteen, be mentally or physically inca-
pacitated. Sections 32(c) and (d) and section 35A(c) provide de-
pendency benefits from birth for children conceived, but not yet born,
at the time of the injury or death of the employee.
In the case of injured employees, the dependency benefits for
children under section 35A(c) are generally paid directly to the em-
ployee in addition to his regular weekly compensation. The Industrial
Accident Board may, however, in its discretion, order payments made
directly to the dependent child, presumably through the other parent
or guardian. This might occur when there is reason to believe that the
employee would not use the money for the benefit of the dependent
child.
Reading sections 32(c) and 31 together, a surviving dependent
parent receives the benefits for both parent and child. Payments
due to children of a former wife or husband are paid to their guardians
or legal representatives for the benefit of such children. Where there
is no surviving parent, or where he or she dies during the payment of
death benefits, the amount that would be payable to the surviving
parent is paid, under section 31, in equal amounts to the children.
However, if the surviving parent remarries, all payments under the
previous arrangements cease and payments are then made to each
child at a specified rate 126
2. Children Living Apart from Employee
Sections 32(c) and 32(d) read together provide that any child
living apart from the employee at death, whether a child of the last
or a former marriage, must show that the employee, at the time of
his death, was legally bound or ordered by law, decree or order of
court or other lawful requirement to support such child. Paragraphs
(c) and (d) of section 32 appear "in language not completely free
from obscurity" and it is essential to read them together and to be
aware that (d) modifies (c).
In order clearly to understand the combined provisions of sec-
tion 32(c) and (d), it is necessary to follow and understand the case
and legislative history of these two subsections. The 1914 amend-
ment to section 32(c) which followed Coakley's Case,12° provided
for the equal division of benefits among the widow, all children of
the widow and employee and the employee's children of former mar-
riages. But there was no provision in section 32(c) applicable to
children living apart from the employee. In fact, there was no pro-
vision anywhere in the statute prior to 1919 as to such children. It
125 Twelve dollars weekly under the present statute.
125 Supra note 78.
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was clear, however, under section 32(c) that a child without a sur-
viving parent had to be living with the deceased employee to qualify
as a conclusive dependent. No such restriction appeared as to children
of a former marriage.
In Holmberg's Case, 127
 the employee left a widow, their child and
a child by a former marriage living apart from the employee. The
court affirmed a decision awarding conclusive dependency to the child
of the former marriage on the ground that there was nothing in sec-
tion 32(c) requiring the child of a former marriage to live with the
employee at his death as distinguished from the child of the last mar-
riage. In Gavaghan's Case,128 a case in which the child was over
eighteen and married but physically incapacitated by total blindness,
the court cited Holmberg's Case and held that the widow had to share
the dependency benefits with this married child. The court said:
In the case of a child of a former wife or husband the Legi;-
lature considers neither the wealth, poverty, residence nor
legal rights to support of that child, and concerns itself only
with the question: Is the child under eighteen years of age,
and if over, is he or she "physically or mentally incapacitated
from earning?" If under eighteen years of age or physically
or mentally incapacitated from earning, the child is con-
clusively presumed by the terms of the act to be wholly de-
pendent for support on the deceased employee.'"
Both Holmberg and Gavaghan involved children of former mar-
riages living apart from the employee at death and both were awarded
conclusive dependency. By contrast, in Moran's Case's° which was
decided after Holmberg and Gavaghan but before the enactment of
section 32(d), the court held that an under eighteen child of the current
marriage, although deserted by the father and living apart for justi-
fiable cause, was not a conclusive dependent. The court felt that the
provision making widows conclusive dependents when living apart
for just cause was not applicable to a child.
Then came the addition of section 32(d) in 1919. Despite all
the difficulties encountered in the division of benefits arising out of
Coakley's Case,' it is interesting to note that in enacting section
32(d), providing for a new category of conclusively dependent chil-
dren, the legislature made no express provision for division of benefits
between these children and those covered under section 32(c). The
holding in Coakley's Case, and the phrase "the death benefit shall be
127 231 Mass. 144, 120 N.E. 353 (1918).
128 232 Mass. 212, 122 N.E. 298 (1919).
128 Id. at 213-14, 122 N.E. at 298.
138 234 Mass. 152, 125 N.E. 157 (1919).
131 216 Mass. 71, 102 N.E. 930 (1913),
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divided between the surviving wife and husband and all the children
of the deceased employee" in section 32(c), however, are ample support
for the proposition that children living apart share equally with those
living with the employee at his death.
In any event, section 32(d) was no doubt enacted precisely be-
cause of the holdings in Holmberg and Gavaghan. The decisions in
these cases revealed the possibility of inequitable divisions of depend-
ency benefits. For example, under section 32(c) a needy widow and
child could be required to share with a child of a former marriage who
was living apart and who had no real need. Furthermore, as in Moran's
Case, a truly needy child of the last marriage could be deprived of
benefits entirely if living apart from the employee for any reason, even
desertion by the employee. Section 32(d) was therefore intended to
strike at both of these inequities at once. Under this new section, the
children in Holmberg and Gavaghan would have to show that the
employee was legally bound to support them before they could qualify
as conclusive dependents. The child in Moran's Case though living
apart, could secure benefits by showing the employee's legal obligation
to support. As the court pointed out in Johnson's Case,132 section 32(d)
modified section 32(c) as to all children living apart from the em-
ployee at death.
Section 32(d), in its original form, brought with it almost as
many problems as it solved. The enactment merely said that there
was conclusive dependency if the employee "was at the time of his
death legally bound to support" the child. The difficulty arose with
the phrase "legally bound to support" and the court looked to estab-
lished common law to determine the relationship between custody of
children and the resulting obligation to support them.
In the period of twenty-eight years between the enactment of
section 32(d) in 1919 and its amendment in 1947, the court made it
clear that: (1) in all cases the guiding principle was that where there
was no custody, there was no obligation to support, including for ex-
ample, the case of children declared neglected and placed in the cus-
tody of the department of welfare;' (2) there was certainly no legal
obligation to support in the case of a child of divorced parents in the
custody of the mother under a decree which made no provision for
the child; '" and (3) the employee was not "legally bound to support"
even where the divorce decree ordered him to pay a weekly sum such
as three dollars' s ' or twelve dollars' s ' for support of the child. In such
832 318 Mass. 741, 64 N.E.2d 94 (1945).
188 Smith's Case, 322 Mass. 186, 76 N.E 2d 315 (1947).
184 Gillender's Case, 243 Mass. 5, 136 N.E. 646 (1922).
138 Miller's Case, 244 Mass. 281, 138 N.E. 254 (1923).
186 Johnson's Case, supra note 132.
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cases the obligation of the employee was limited by decree and did
not bring him within the unlimited legal obligation intended by the
statute.
Horovitz, writing prior to the 1947 addition of section 32(d),
pointed out in his well known treatise on workmen's compensation
that:
In Massachusetts the child collects if the mother, wrong-
fully deserted by the husband, takes the child and later
lives in adultery, but not if a mother, virtuous or otherwise,
has custody by divorce decree, the theory being that the
decree places the legal duty of support on the mother and
relieves the father—a theory that often places on charity a
liability that the insurer should bear.'"
Section 32(d) was amended in 1947 expanding the phrase under
discussion to read: "legally bound or ordered by law, decree or order
of court or other lawful requirement to support such children." Under
this provision, the children in the Milterns and Johnson's° cases who
were covered by weekly support payments under divorce decrees
would qualify as conclusive dependents. The child in Gillander14°
would not qualify because there was neither obligation nor decree nor
any other lawful requirement to support. The child in Smith's Case"'
would qualify because there was at least the lawful requirement that
a father should support his child.
The court in Smith's Case explained the purpose of the 1947
amendment:
The Legislature has recognized the hardship that has resulted
to children living apart from their father in depriving them
of the benefits of the workmen's compensation act because
their custody has been taken from him, and has ameliorated
to some extent this unfortunate situation by amending clause(d) 142
It is historically fair to assume, as suggested in this quotation from
Smith's Case, that the liberalizing 1947 amendment, applicable to
death cases, was conceived and grew out of the Gillander and Miller
cases, and perhaps similar cases that never reached the Supreme
Judicial Court.
No decided cases of children of injured, as distinguished from de-
187 Horovitz, Workmen's Compensation 301-02 (1944).
138 Supra note 135.
138 Supra note 136.
140 Supra note 134.
141 Supra note 133.
142 Id. at 189-90, >6 N.E.2d at 31>
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ceased, employees which raise the same problem as in Gillander and
Miller can be found. The curious fact, however, is that the liberalizing
phrase added to section 32(d) in 1947 had already appeared about a
year earlier in section 35A(c) with respect to children of injured em-
ployees. The original section 35A which appeared in 1945 was a brief
section providing dependency compensation for injured employees for
the first time. The section merely said that dependency compensation
would be paid ". . . for each person wholly dependent as defined in
section thirty-two . . . ," thus merely importing that provision of sec-
tion 32. In 1946 came the more liberal provision in paragraph (c) of
an expanded section 35A applicable to children separated from injured
employees. A year later came the amendment to section 32(d), which
was in turn enacted almost verbatim as it appeared in section 35A(c).
VIII. LIMITS, COMPUTATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF
DEPENDENCY BENEFITS
A. Cessation of Widow's Benefits Upon Re-Marriage
Under the present statute a widow receives weekly benefits up
to a maximum total of fourteen thousand dollars. She receives this
statutory maximum even though she is fully self-supporting. There-
after she continues to receive weekly benefits only for such periods
as she is not in fact fully self-supporting. At any time after the death of
her husband, her benefits cease if she remarries." 3 This latter provision
for cessation of benefits upon remarriage has been criticized as being
contrary to public policy on the ground that it stands as an induce-
ment to widows to live in sin in order to secure continuing benefits.'"
Various changes have been suggested to remedy this situation in-
cluding the payment of a lump sum upon re-marriage. Such lump
sum payments are in effect in some states."'
B. Continuation of Widow's Benefits After Statutory Maximum
1. Procedure for Benefits Beyond Statutory Maximum
It is not clear under the statute whether a widow is required to
file a claim for further death benefits after the maximum statutory
benefits of fourteen thousand dollars have been paid. The current
143 Provisions under section 31 are, since 1945, generally applicable to the "widower"
and "husband" as well as to the widow, except that after the statutory maximum has
been paid there is no provision for further benefits to the widower as there is in the
case of the widow.
144 See 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law 64.40, at 131 (1952); citing
Gaudreau v. Eclipse Pioneer Div. of Bendix Air Corp., 137 N.J.L. 666, 61 A.2d 227
(1948) in which a widow living with a man without benefit of marriage is not de-
prived of dependency benefits. Note also that prior to 1922, death benefits to widows
continued even after remarriage. Bott's Case, 230 Mass. 152, 119 N.E. 755 (1918).
145 See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. 	 81-1315(d) (1947); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 	 81-11-
4 (1953).
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practice of the Industrial Accident Board requires that the widow
must make a claim and meet the burden of proving further entitle-
ment. There is some doubt as to the validity of this practice.
The statute states that the widow ". . . shall continue to receive
further payments . . ." if she is unmarried and not fully self-support-
ing. The statute continues:
Either party may request hearings at reasonable intervals
. . . on the question of granting such payments, or on the
question of restoration of such payments, or on the ques-
tions of the discontinuance of such payments.'"
A hearing for "discontinuance of such payments" can only mean
that payments shall previously have been made before they can be dis-
continued. It may be as consistent an interpretation of this provision
that payments "shall continue" uninterrupted after the maximum, until
a hearing and a discontinuance, as an interpretation that at reasonable
intervals after payments beyond the maximum the insurer may have
a hearing for discontinuance. In either case it is not clear whether pay-
ments shall continue after the maximum until a hearing to discontinue,
or whether payments stop automatically after the maximum until a
hearing to continue payments.
Whatever the meaning of this statutory provision, the current
practice of automatic cessation of benefits and the requirement that
the widow request a hearing for further payments frequently creates
hardship. Under the present practice, the insurer is required to give
notice to the board that payments are about to reach the maximum."'
The board in turn notifies the widow. If the insurer inadvertently
fails to give notice, or if the widow, as frequently occurs, misunder-
stands the significance of the notice, an interval occurs from the time
payments stop to the time the widow files a claim and establishes
her entitlement, of ten with serious financial distress.
It would seem much more consistent with the humanitarian pur-
pose of the statute to require the insurer to request a hearing and se-
cure a decision before discontinuance of payments. The insurer keeps
careful records, knows when the maximum will be reached and can
easily request a hearing long enough in advance to avoid any possibility
of payments beyond the statutory maximum when the widow may not
be entitled to such payments.
2. "In Fact not Fully Self-Supporting"
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has never been called
upon to interpret the so-called "widows for life" provision of section
146 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 152,
	 31 (Supp. 1963), end of second paragraph.
147 Massachusetts Industrial Accident Board Circular Letter No. 96 (March 18,
1955).
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31. Under this provision the widow continues to receive benefits
(I
. . . during such periods as . . . she is in fact not fully self-sup-
porting," even after the statutory maximum has been paid.
The words "in fact" present the initial problem. May the Indus-
trial Accident Board take the extreme position that a widow is in fact
fully self-supporting if she is mentally and physically competent and
able to work even though unemployed? May the board thus find in
the words "in fact" a legislative intent that the widow has a duty to
apply her ability and competency in order to make herself fully self-
supporting? Analysis of these two words in the context of the provision
itself and in the statute as a whole clearly compels a negative answer
to both of these questions.
The legislature well could have provided that the widow receive
continuing benefits "during such periods as she is not fully self-sup-
porting," thus omitting the words "in fact" and allowing the board
wider discretion in the interpretation of this provision. The deliberate
insertion of these two words, however, manifests its intent to limit the
board's determination to the clear and simple meaning of these words
and to the facts at the time of the determination, to simplify the
widow's burden of proof and to protect her from over-interpretation
and repeated and harassing litigation. ,
The standard of "incapacity for work" is employed in sections
34, 34A and 35 as a basis for the payment of compensation to injured
employees. The legislature, though obviously aware of this standard,
deliberately chose not to apply it to the widow's benefits provision.
By the use, instead, of the words "in fact fully self-supporting," the
legislature clearly intended that the unemployed widow need show
nothing more than her unemployment in order to continue to receive
benefits after the statutory maximum had been reached. Substantial
and lasting security will be thus provided for the widow during those
periods following the payment of the statutory maximum when she is
not, for whatever reason, in fact fully self-supporting.
The interpretation of the entire "widows for life" provision be-
comes somewhat more involved, however, when the widow is employed
after the statutory maximum is reached. This raises the problem of
interpreting the words "fully self-supporting." How much must a
widow earn to be fully self-supporting? Also, is the same standard of
living to be applied to every widow for the purpose of invoking the
phrase "fully self-supporting?"
The modest compensation paid to widows ($35 weekly under the
present statute) could not have been designed to set the standard of
living for widows. The words "fully self-supporting" obviously mean
that a widow may work to supplement her small compensation allow-
ance; the combined income providing .a more decent standard of living.
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If the purpose of the statute is not to be defeated, only when a widow's
income, apart from compensation, reaches a level commensurate with
a reasonably decent standard of living may compensation be discon-
tinued. Here, also, as in the case of the unemployed widow, no con-
sideration should be given to the question of whether the widow is
capable of being fully self-supporting. The only question is whether
she is in fact fully self-supporting. The widow may, as a matter of
choice, not work at all or she may earn a small supplemental income,
yet still retain her benefits under the Act.
A widow left with minor children has a legal and moral obligation
to support these children and "fully self-supporting", therefore, must
at least be earnings sufficient to support the children as well as herself
at a decent standard of living. In cases involving the payment of par-
tial compensation, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court emphat-
ically asserts the parent's obligation to support minor children and
holds that this obligation is part of the parent's total requirement for
self-support. In the case of a mother who had a ". . . duty to furnish
reasonable support to the minor child, amounts expended by her for
such support were expended for her own purposes. . . ."'"a
To have any meaning, "fully self-supporting" must be determined
in the light of current living costs. The board, therefore, should take
judicial notice of current living costs in determining whether a widow
is fully self-supporting. On the lowest conceivable level, a decent
standard of living must mean at least a subsistence standard plus a
reasonable allowance for some of the amenities of life enjoyed by the
widow prior to the death of the employee.
The legislature could not have intended to impose the same stand-
ard for every widow. The statute as a whole recognizes and provides
in several instances for varying standards of living. The employee's
average weekly wage determines the rate of total compensation for
injured employees and death benefits for dependents in fact. The
average wage also determines the rate of partial compensation. Depen-
dency compensation for injured employees is paid over and above regu-
lar compensation up to an amount equal to the average weekly wage.
In all these instances average weekly wages represent various stand-
ards of living. Therefore, widows accustomed to higher standards of
living should be allowed higher earnings before being deprived of their
compensation benefits. The legislature could not have meant to depress
all widows to the lowest common denominator in living standards.
No consideration should be given to any ratio between the amount
of compensation received and the amount the widow earns in deter-
mining whether the widow is self-supporting. Fixed compensation rates
naturally lag considerably behind rising living costs. Thus, depending
147a Correia's Case, 275 Mass. 340, 342, 175 N.E. 731, 732 (1931).
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on current living costs, widows must be permitted to earn increasingly
larger wages over and above compensation rates, and should be in fact
fully self-supporting from these earnings before losing their compen-
sation benefits.
There are no decided cases on the question of whether "fully
self-supporting" is determined solely by measurement of income from
employment earnings. The court would probably hold that a widow
may continue to receive dependency benefits after the statutory maxi-
mum has been reached even if she receives gifts and contributions
from relatives and friends sufficient to support her fully. It is not
clear whether a widow who can support herself fully from income
from investments and securities may receive benefits after reaching
the statutory maximum. It may be argued that since dependency
under section 1(3) is based on earnings, fully self-supporting must
mean fully self-supporting from earnings to be consistent with the
pattern of the act.
C. Effective and Limiting Dates
1. Status: Conclusive or in Fact
Rights under the Workmen's Compensation Act are fixed as of
the date of injury. 1" Dependency status, however, is determined by
the date of the injury or the date of death, depending upon the ap-
plicable statutory provisions. Having determined dependency status,
dependents' rights are then determined as of the date of injury.
For living employees, the date of injury determines conclusive
dependency status and dependency in fact under section 35A, as well
as fixing the amounts to be paid. In death cases, however, the date
of injury fixes the amounts of dependency benefits to be paid, but
dependency status is determined either at the time of injury or at
the time of death. Conclusive dependency status for wives, husbands
and children is determined at the time of death.' 4° For parents of
unmarried children under eighteen conclusive dependency status is
determined at the time of injury resulting in death."° Similarly, if a
parent, conclusively or in fact dependent upon a deceased child, should
die, the surviving parent succeeds to the rights of the deceased parent
if the child was living with the surviving parent at the time of the
injury resulting in the child's death."'
Dependency in fact status in death cases under section 32 ". . .
148 Brophy's Case, 327 Mass. 557, 99 N.E.2d 922 (1951); Smith's Case, supra
note 133; Beausoleil's Case, 321 Mass. 344, 73 N.E.2d 461 (1947); Sanborn's Case, 303
Mass. 225, 21 N.E.2d 248 (1939); Crowley's Case, 287 Mass. 367, 191 N.E. 668 ( 1934 );
Ressi's Case, supra note 124.
145 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 152, ; 32(a)-(d) (1957).
155 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 152, 132(e) (1957).
151 Ibid.
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shall be determined ... as the fact may be at the time of the injury,
or at the time of his death . . . ." When the employee is injured and
survives for a pericid of time, conclusive or in fact dependency status
is initially determined under section 35A. At his death the determina-
tion shifts to section 32. One who cannot prove dependency in fact
at death may still secure death benefits by proving dependency in
fact at injury. Dependents in fact continue in this status unless a
conclusive dependent appears between the date of injury and date of
death, in which case dependents in fact are excluded. This may occur,
for example, if the employee has a mother dependent in fact at the
time of his injury and he marries after his injury. It may also occur
if he has a wife living apart at the time of his injury"' and a living
mother, both being dependents in fact, and the wife rejoins him prior
to his death.
Prior to November 6, 1950, section 31 provided death benefits
only to those dependent upon the employee "at the time of his in-
jury." On that date the words "or at the time of his death" were added
to the first sentence of section 31 covering conclusive dependents and
to the first two sentences in the last paragraph of section 31 covering
dependents in fact. The same words were also added to the last para-
graph of section 32 covering dependents in fact. These words were
no doubt added to mitigate the type of ruling made in Brophy's
Case,' that a spouse or other dependent could not secure benefits if
the appropriate dependency relationship could not be established at
injury, even if it was established at death. By the addition of these
words, dependency in fact may be established in death cases either at
injury or death, but to take as a conclusive dependent it still remains
necessary in most cases164
 to qualify at the time of death. The signifi-
cant effect of this change was to permit anyone who became dependent
after the injury, but before death, to qualify.
2. Children Under Eighteen
Sections 31, 32 and 35A provide benefits for children, who are
generally defined as being less than eighteen. Section 31 provides:
If the widow or widower dies, such amount or amounts as
would have been payable to or for her or his own use and
for the benefit of all children of the employee shall be paid
in equal shares to all the surviving children of the employee.
The same provision for division among all the children is made when
the employee dies without a surviving wife or husband.
152 Newman's Case, supra note 93.
153 Supra note 148.
151 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 152,
	 32(a)-(d) (1957); however, see
	 32(e).
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Canavan's Case' answered the question of what happens when
children, taking what would be payable to the widow or widower, reach
the age of eighteen. The claimant in that case contended that upon
reaching eighteen he should continue to receive benefits until he re-
ceived the maximum that would have been payable to either of his
surviving parents. The court denied the claim holding, "The child is
eligible to receive his parent's share because he is under eighteen, not
because ... he has taken over any rights his parent had.” 15°
D. Computation and Distribution of Partial Dependency Benefits
1. Generally
There is generally no problem in the determination of amounts
to be paid to total dependents. These are absolute amounts specifically
set forth in the statute for both injured and deceased employees. 157 In
the case of injured employees, there is no partial dependency. Prob-
lems of computing dependency benefits arise for the most part in cases
of partial dependents of deceased employees.
The determination of partial dependency status and the amount
of partial dependency benefits to be paid is a frequent source of con-
fusion, and the distinction between the two must constantly be kept
in mind. One of the several factors' 58 determinative of dependency
status is whether the dependent received contributions out of the em-
ployee's earnings. The amount of dependency benefits is computed
on the basis of the percentage of the employee's total earnings con-
tributed to the dependent.
2. Computation of Partial Dependency Benefits
Partial dependency benefits are computed on the basis of the
percentage of annual earnings of the employee contributed to the
partial dependent multiplied by the weekly benefits paid to total
dependents.15° For example, if the employee contributed fifty per cent
of his earnings to the partial dependent, and a total dependent would
receive thirty-five dollars weekly, the partial dependent will receive
seventeen dollars and fifty cents weekly in partial dependency. Under
the present statute, there is also a minimum payment of twelve
dollars weekly for partial dependents who are next of kin and who
have received support contributions during the year preceding death.
In computing partial dependency benefits, it is the percentage
that is controlling, and not any absolute amount that the employee
155 331 Mass. 444, 120 N.E.2d 206 (1954).
156 Id. at 447, 120 N.E.2d at 207.
157 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 152, 19 31, 35A (Supp. 1963).
158 See Part V, supra.
159 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 152, { 31 (Supp. 1963), last paragraph.
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earns or contributes. Partial dependency benefits, based on relatively
lower wages and relatively smaller contributions, may be larger than
benefits based on higher wages and larger contributions. Thus, if the
employee earned fifty dollars weekly and contributed twenty dollars
weekly, the dependent would receive benefits of fourteen dollars
weekly assuming a thirty-five dollar total rate. If the employee earned
one hundred and fifty dollars weekly and contributed thirty dollars,
the dependent would receive seven dollars in weekly benefits, i.e.,
twenty per cent of thirty-five dollars.
If there are insufficient facts in evidence to compute partial de-
pendency, there can be no payment of compensation. In Hassan's
Case')
 the employee tried to send five hundred dollars to his wife
in a foreign country in the year preceding his death. He was unable to
do so because of the turbulent international situation. Wife and child
were partial dependents in the sense that they had received contribu-
tions from the employee in previous years. Since there were no con-
tributions in the year preceding death there could be no computation
of entitlement and, consequently, no award.
The amount contributed by the employee must be in evidence in
order to compute partial dependency. This amount may be arrived at
indirectly by computing the amount by which the dependent's living
expenses exceed his income from all other sources."'
The earnings from which contributions are made need not have
come solely from the last employer of the decedent. Even if the em-
ployee died before receiving any pay from his last employer, his
partial dependent qualifies if the employee had made contributions
out of any earnings received in the year preceding death. 182 These
earnings for the year preceding death are taken into account regard-
less of their source. However, the amount contributed by the employee
to the dependent is limited to those contributions made during the
same year.'"
Material contributions, other than cash, would appear to be
eligible as contributions for the purpose of establishing dependency.
In McMahon's Case,'" in which partial dependency was upheld, the
sole contribution was one of twenty-seven dollars given to the depend-
ent to purchase furniture for the household. Since the contribution
was made for this specific purpose, it may be reasonable to expect
that partial dependency would be upheld if the employee had con-
tributed the furniture instead of the cash to purchase the furniture.
160 Hassan's Case, 240 Mass. 355, 134 N.E. 260 (1922).
161 Ward's Case, 286 Mass. 72, 190 N.E. 25 (1934).
162 Freeman's Case, 233 Mass. 287, 123 N.E. 845 (1919).
163 Hassan's Case, supra note 160.
164 229 Mass. 48, 118 N.E. 189 (1918).
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The contemplated result would allow contributions of property as-
sociated with the normal maintenance of a person or family, such as
furniture, food, clothing or a place to live, to qualify as contributions
for the purpose of establishing dependency status. There is language
in McMahon's Case supporting the inference that contributions other
than cash would be recognized if the question were directly presented
to the court.' Appropriate evidence would, of course, have to appear
as to the monetary value of such contributions in order that depend-
ency benefits could be computed in accordance with the requirements
of the statute.'"
Payments to the claimant for business expenses'" or for educa-
tion,' standing alone, do not qualify as eligible contributions. Nor do
they represent an acceptable "need" for determining dependency in
fact.' However, a payment for the claimant's vacation may qualify
both as a "contribution" and a "need.""° It is inconceivable that
business expenses could under any circumstances qualify as a "con-
tribution" or "need." It is reasonable to expect, however, that if pay-
ments for education are a part of the general support of the claimant,
they would qualify in both categories, just as payments for vacations
qualify as part of the general support of the claimant. The "surround-
ing" circumstances within which contributions are made, determine
whether the contributions may be included in the computation of
dependency benefits.'"
It is not settled in Massachusetts whether services performed by
the dependent for the claimant qualify as contributions. In McMahon's
Case"' such services are mentioned by the court as the setting against
which the twenty-seven dollars for furniture was acceptable as a con-
tribution. In an Indiana case, an award of death benefits was upheld
where a nineteen year old, who had never worked before and who had
made no cash contributions to the claimant, had performed valuable
services tilling the soil on his father's farm."
3. Partial Dependency of Parents Upon Minor Children
Problems which arose in the earlier cases in proving partial de-
pendency of parents on minor children have been eliminated in large
166 See also Doherty's Case, 277 Mass. 339, 178 N.E. 515 (1931), in which the
court found against the claimant on other grounds, but contributions other than cash
are mentioned without rejecting them per se as ineligible contributions.
166 Hassan's Case, supra note 160.
167 Merchant's Case, 282 Mass. 36, 184 N.E. 390 (1933).
168 Doherty's Case, supra note 165.
169 See Part V, D, supra.
170 Ressi's Case, 243 Mass. 528, 137 N.E. 703 (1923).
171 Ibid. See also McMahon's Case, supra note 164.
172 McMahon's Case, supra note 164.
173 Ritchie v. Indiana State Highway Comm'n, 101 Ind. App. 32, 198 N.E. 125
(1935).
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measure by the enactment in 1926 of section 32(e). This subsection
makes a parent a conclusive dependent of an unmarried child under
eighteen living with the parent at the time of the injury resulting in
death. Some of these partial dependency problems may still arise,
however, in cases involving minor children over eighteen; and in the
situations in which the child under eighteen is not living with the
parent at the time of injury and the parent continues to support the
child while receiving his contributions from earnings. The latter situa-
tion generally occurs when the children are living away from home on
temporary jobs. The court would either find, by analogy to temporary
separation between husband and wife, that there was conclusive de-
pendency and no real living apart,'" or it would apply the well-estab-
lished rules of partial dependency.
Under these rules a parent is legally entitled to the wages of a
minor child, and the child is obliged to turn the wages over to the
parent. At the same time the parent has a legal obligation to support
the minor child. The obligation of the parent to support the child
exists apart from the right to the child's wages and the child's obliga-
tion to turn such wages over to the parent. If the parent can show
any dependency upon the child's wages, he qualifies as a partial de-
pendent even if he spends more on the support of the child than he
receives from the child. The amount contributed by the parent for
the child's support is not deducted from the amount contributed by
the child to the parent. The more the parent must contribute to the
child's support, the stronger is the proof of his need of the child's
financial contribution. If the parent establishes partial dependency,
the only remaining question, for purposes of computing the amount
of the benefits, is how much the child actually contributed out of his
earnings.'"
4. Partial Dependency Based on Contribution to the Family Fund
It is not unusual for wage earners to contribute all or part of their
earnings to a general family fund. When the employee dies, partial
dependency benefits are based upon the percentage of his annual
earnings contributed, multiplied by the amount provided in the statute
for total compensation. Together with the problem of proving contri-
bution and earnings, it has been necessary to determine in some cases
who is the dependent and in other cases the relative extent of depend-
ency when there is more than one dependent.
174 Allen's Case, 318 Mass. 640, 63 N.E.2d 356 (1945); Harrington's Case, 297
Mass. 125, 7 N.E.2d 732 (1937); Gilson's Case, 254 Mass. 460, 150 N.E. 183 (1926).
'75 See generally Cammick's Case, 259 Mass. 209, 155 N.E. 870 (1927); Dembinski's
Case, 231 Mass. 261, 120 N.E. 856 (1918); Gove's Case, 223 Mass. 187,'11 N.E. 702
(1916); Murphy's Case, 218 Mass. 278, 105 N.E. 635 (1914).
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When the contributions of a minor child go into a general family
fund the dependency benefits go to the father in the normal family
situation. This rule was applied in Dembinski's Case in 1918, when the
board attempted to award benefits jointly to both parents.' 18 With
the addition of subsection (e) to section 32 in 1926 the "parent" (in
the singular) became a conclusive dependent of a child under eighteen.
This meant, in effect, that in cases of children under eighteen, the
father received the death benefits. To this extent section 32(e)
followed the rule in Dembinski's Case.
Concurrently, the problem had arisen as to whether other de-
pendents could succeed the recipient of dependency benefits when the
latter died.'" It seemed as reasonable to have mothers succeed de-
ceased fathers as beneficiaries as it did to have children succeed
widows.'" Consequently, in 1935, this provision was added to the
statute.'T9 Presently, if the father dies while receiving the death
benefits of a child under eighteen, the mother succeeds to the father's
rights.
Section 32(e) does not apply when the child is a minor over
eighteen. However, there cannot be a joint award to both parents be-
cause the common law rule applies and the father of the minor re-
ceives the full benefits.'" Whether the mother succeeds to the rights
of the father upon his death in the case of minor children over eighteen
depends upon whether the court would make a ruling analogous to
that in Bartoni's Case, 181 involving widows and children. There seems
to be no reason why the rule should not apply to such surviving
mothers. The court in Musgrave's Case,182 however, held to the con-
trary.
In Musgrave's Case the employee was nineteen years old when
he died in an industrial accident. The father was awarded compensa-
tion; when he died, the mother succeeded him on an award by the
board, affirmed by the Superior Court. The Supreme Judicial Court
reversed. In so doing the court reasoned that the rule in Bartoni's
Case did not apply because the mother was not dependent upon the
employee at the time of injury as was the child dependent on the
widow in Bartoni's Case. There was evidence in Musgrave's Case that
the employee's contribution was to the family fund, but as a minor
178 Dembinski's Case, supra note 175.
177 Pagnoni's Case, 230 Mass. 9, 118 N.E. 948 (1918); Bartoni's Case, 225 Mass.
349, 114 N.E. 663 (1916); Murphy's Case, 224 Mass. 592, 113 N.E. 283 (1916).
178 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 152, 	 31 (Supp. 1963).
179 Mass, Gen. Laws Ann. eh. 152, § 32 (1957), next to last paragraph .
189 Dembinski's Case, supra note 175.
" 1 Bartoni's Case supra note 177; Murphy's Case, supra note 177.
182 281 Mass. 416, 183 N.E. 749 (1933).
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his wages belonged to the father "° Had the employee been over
twenty-one the situation would be otherwise. It would also be other-
wise if the father had been disabled and unable to earn a living,'"
because then the mother would depend directly upon the employee as
did the child in Bartoni's Case. Thus precariously do mothers live
when their husbands are well and their children are between the ages
of eighteen and twenty-one.
Joint awards to parents and other qualified dependents are
permissible when the employee at death had passed majority and had
contributed out of his earnings to a family fund. Clearly, when the
employee is not a minor there is no paternal or parental right to•his
wages and he may have more than one dependent as in Osterbrink's
Case" and Ward's Case.""
Since it is often impossible to determine the relative extent of
dependency when the employee's contributions are to a family fund,
the court allows the award of benefits in equal shares to the depen-
dents. This is an exception to the general requirement that the relative
extent of dependency must be shown. The theory appears to be that
it is a fair inference that dependents in a family fund arrangement
share equally in the fund and are therefore entitled to equal depend-
ency status. This is undoubtedly the law despite the seemingly con-
trary holding in Pagnoni's Case,'" in which a joint award to the par-
ents was reversed and the case remanded for findings of relative
dependence. Pagnoni's Case followed closely on Osterbrink's Case, both
decided in 1918, antedating the decision in Ward by sixteen years.
Equal shares were upheld for the adult daughters of the employee
in Osterbrink and for the parents in Ward, although there was no
evidence of relative dependency in either case. In both cases the em-
ployees contributed to family funds.
It is difficult to distinguish Pagnoni and Ward. In both these
cases the claimants were the parents, the employees were living apart
from the parents and there were other wage-earning children living
with the parents. There was evidence in each of these cases that
neither parent had earned any money for at least a year prior to the
employee's death. If there is any distinction, it appears in the record
and not the reported decisions. In Pagnoni there was also some
evidence that the father did have some earnings. The board evidently
chose to believe the contrary evidence, however, and it was not a
question before the court. Pagnoni was decided very soon after Oster-
188 See cases cited in note 175, supra.
184 Freeman's Case, 233 Mass. 287, 123 N.E. 845 (1919).
185 229 Mass. 407, 118 N.E. 657 (1918).
180 Supra note 161.
181 Supra note 177.
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brink but the latter was not cited in the brief for the claimant. The case
was not argued as a family fund case and this appears to be the most
likely explanation for the holding. The Ward and Osterbrink cases,
however, establish the rule for joint awards in family fund cases with-
out specific proof of relative dependency.
DC. CONCLUSION
Practitioners in the field of workmen's compensation can no doubt
suggest many significant problems not discussed here. The very nature
of dependency relationships makes for an infinite variety of possibili-
ties. This article was limited to the problems raised in the decided
cases and to some extent to questions not decided, but suggested by
these cases. If some few guideposts were raised and if some contri-
bution was made towards clarification, the mission was at least in
part successful.
It must be clear that no amount of legislative amendment will
fill all the gaps in so complex a field. It must be equally clear that
where statutory gaps are encountered in a given case, they must be
bridged in decision by the humanitarian purpose of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, a purpose so obviously intended by the legislature
and so frequently reiterated by the court.
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